NATION, Page 14COVER STORY: Not AgainA grisly image of a dead hostage outrages the U.S. With fewoptions, Bush gets a surprising hint of help from IranBy Richard Lacayo
The hostage scenario has become numbingly familiar. The
sadistic videotapes of frightened captives, followed by threats of
execution. The White House dispatching naval fleets or listening
for some faint reply down a clogged diplomatic channel to the
Middle East. Last week it was George Bush's turn to try urgent
appeals and gunboat maneuvers while an angry public fulminated at
American impotence. Just six months in office, Bush had become the
third U.S. President in a row caught in the same wretched
predicament. The latest hostage crisis, however, yielded a gruesome
new image of horror: a man, bound and gagged, dangling from a
makeshift scaffold.
The hanging man was almost certainly U.S. Marine Lieut. Colonel
William Higgins, 44, who was kidnaped last year while serving as
head of an observer team attached to the U.N. peacekeeping force
in Lebanon. His captors claimed they killed him in retaliation for
Israel's seizure of Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid, a presumed leader of
Shi`ite Hizballah terrorists, during a raid into southern Lebanon.
U.S. officials now believe, however, that Higgins had been dead for
some time, then used for his kidnapers' macabre display. No matter
which terrible theory turns out to be true, the image of Higgins'
body was a brutal reminder that, ten years after the seizure of
hostages at the American embassy in Tehran, the U.S. still lacks
any truly effective means for dealing with terrorist kidnapings.
The grueling events of the week put strains on U.S.-Israeli
relations over the question of whether Israel had recklessly
endangered the lives of Americans. To the Israelis, at least,
aggressiveness was clearly preferable to the unbudging status quo
that the U.S. appears to tolerate in the unending hostage dilemma.
All week the White House navigated between the same poles of
military threat and diplomatic engagement that earlier
Administrations had tried. Yet by week's end there was a
tantalizing glimpse of flexibility: Iran's new President, Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, offered to "help" find a solution to the
hostage problem, thus raising the hope that Bush will not be boxed
in by the implacable hostility of Iran as his predecessors were
during the reign of the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Nothing better illustrated the endlessness of the hostage
dilemma than the threat that Joseph Cicippio would quickly succeed
Higgins as the next dangling man. No sooner had the videotape of
Higgins' body been released to news agencies in Beirut than a
countdown began toward the execution of Cicippio, 58, kidnaped
three years ago from the campus of the American University of
Beirut. Cicippio's last-minute reprieve was accompanied by a threat
that the clock could be set ticking again. His captors demanded
that Israel free not only Obeid but also unspecified Palestinians
and Lebanese guerrillas. "Acceptance should be announced within
days," they added. "Otherwise the initiative will be considered
canceled."
In effect, Cicippio's suspended sentence left his loved ones
-- and the U.S. -- suspended as well. Behind Cicippio is a tattered
line of 14 other Western hostages, eight of them Americans, still
believed to be held in Lebanon. Other Americans continue to live
and work in that shattered country despite official warnings issued
by Washington in January 1987 that in effect they are on their own.
So long as the U.S. and its citizens venture forth freely in the
world, they will be vulnerable to extortion by kidnapers. Trying
to come to terms with that implacable fact, Ronald Reagan stumbled
and Jimmy Carter fell.
What should the U.S. do? There is an instinctive longing for
the bravado of 1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt was faced
with the kidnaping of an American, Ion Perdicaris, by a Moroccan
bandit named Ahmed Raisuli. Legend has it that Roosevelt pronounced
a famous ultimatum: "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." (It is less
well remembered that Perdicaris was freed only after the Moroccan
government paid ransom.) But a poll conducted last Thursday for
TIME/CNN by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman indicates substantial public
recognition that a big stick may not be the answer to an explosive
and delicate situation. Among those questioned, 45% said the U.S.
should retaliate in this instance with military action and 39% said
it should not. But when presented with an array of options, 58% of
the respondents said the U.S. should negotiate with terrorist
groups for the hostages' release, and between 45% and two-thirds
rejected various specified U.S. military options.
The latest crisis was sparked by events in Lebanon that
dramatized the difference between the Israeli and American
responses to hostage taking. On July 28, two dozen Israeli
commandos staged a daring raid into the southern Lebanese village
of Jibchit. Their goal was to seize Obeid, 32, whom the Israelis
identify as a spiritual and military leader of the Shi`ite
fundamentalist Hizballah (Party of God), a group with close ties
to Iran that is holding most of the Western hostages. The Israelis
say they wanted Obeid as a bargaining chip to gain release of three
Israeli military men taken prisoner in southern Lebanon in 1986.
The Israeli Cabinet approved the mission by a vote of 11 to 1
in June, after an earlier kidnaping failed to impress Mustafa
Dirani, the man believed to be holding one of the soldiers. Last
December, Israeli commandos seized Jawad Kasafi, a Dirani
associate. But when Jerusalem offered a swap, Hizballah declined
even to reply. Israel concluded it needed a bigger fish, and Obeid
was selected.
The raid was carried out by two dozen members of the elite
Sayeret Matkal unit, which reports only to chief of military
intelligence Amnon Shachak. As Israeli jets flew overhead to drown
out the noise, a darkened CH-53 helicopter landed after midnight
on the outskirts of Jibchit. Lightly armed with silencer-equipped
Uzis, pistols and a few small explosives, the commandos crept
toward Obeid's house in the center of the village. One team guarded
the neighborhood while another raided the house and abducted Obeid
and two men who worked as bodyguards. Another man was killed by the
Israelis when he stepped out of a neighboring house. Obeid's wife,
bound and gagged, was left in the house with his three children,
who were untouched.
Although the kidnaping was a success, two days later the larger
plan appeared to be backfiring. Recognizing that the U.S. could be
more easily pressured than Israel by threats against its hostages,
a Hizballah front group calling itself the Organization of the
Oppressed on Earth vowed to kill Colonel Higgins unless Obeid was
released. Israeli Cabinet officials convened an emergency meeting
to formulate a counteroffer. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin
proposed an exchange of Obeid and the estimated 150 Lebanese
Shi`ites held in Israeli prisons for the release of the three
Israeli soldiers and all the Western hostages.
When Israel sought Washington's approval for Rabin's idea, Bush
gave thinly veiled encouragement. On Monday, before the
announcement of Higgins' killing, Secretary of State James Baker
instructed the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, William Brown, to pass
on the message that the U.S. would not "object" to the proposed
swap. Though it was a pale green light at best, the Israelis
recognized it as a sufficient O.K. But by the time the Israelis
announced their offer, videotapes of Higgins' hanging body were
already being distributed by Hizballah.
Israeli officials insist they had indeed considered the
possibility of a backlash by Hizballah. Rabin told the Knesset on
Wednesday that the government had taken into account all possible
outcomes, "including the event that took place, and worse." He did
not say whether it had concluded that an American hostage might be
executed or whether it had anticipated the U.S. public outcry over
the Higgins outrage.
Soon after the videotape was broadcast, minority leader Robert
Dole took to the Senate floor to make an unusually harsh assessment
of Israel's actions. He charged that Israel had "struck out alone,
free-lancing," with no regard for the American hostages. Said Dole:
"Perhaps a little more responsibility on the part of the Israelis
would be refreshing."
Israel was also widely criticized for not informing Washington
about its plans to seize Obeid, though advance consultation would
have made the U.S. an accomplice to Israeli actions, further
alienating Arab nations from the U.S. Some in both houses of
Congress came to Israel's defense, stressing that to drive a wedge
between the U.S. and its closest Middle East ally would merely
serve the interests of the kidnapers. For its part, the White House
called pointedly throughout the week for the release of all
hostages -- presumably including Obeid.
At the first reports of Higgins' murder, the President cut
short a Western-states speechmaking trip to return to Washington.
He quickly conveyed his sorrow and outrage in a phone call to
Higgins' wife Robin, a Marine public affairs officer. But
throughout the week Bush was careful to apply a lesson that had
been painfully learned by Jimmy Carter: never let a hostage crisis
appear to consume the presidency. The President went to unusual
lengths to create what might be called a mood of concerned
normalcy, acting as host at a barbecue for members of Congress,
playing tennis, even attending a ball game between the Baltimore
Orioles and his son George's Texas Rangers.
Behind the scenes, the Administration was working in a crisis
mode. In private Bush described himself as going through "the most
difficult time of my presidency," and by week's end the strain in
his face was pronounced. To save Cicippio, the State Department set
up a round-the-clock hostage task force, while the White House
launched a diplomatic rescue effort that one U.S. envoy called "a
full-court press on everybody we know." Characteristically, the
President worked the phone with the heads of state of most European
allies and nations in the Middle East -- with the notable exception
of Syria's Hafez Assad, whom Bush does not trust.
Bush was also considering a military response. About three
dozen U.S. warships were dispatched toward Lebanon and Iran. Iran
was notified that as the paymaster of the Hizballah, it would be
held responsible if any American hostages were harmed. Through a
variety of conflicting leaks, the Administration let it be known
that if Cicippio was killed, the President was prepared to order
an air strike against suspected terrorist bases.
But Tehran was being offered carrots as well as sticks. Through
acquaintances like Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, Bush
offered the possibility of a "constructive relationship" with Iran.
The U.S. overtures to Iran went "well beyond the current situation
with the hostages," said a senior White House official. Another
official said that once the hostage crisis is settled, the U.S.
will be willing to discuss renewed "trade and commerce," as well
as possibly freeing $4 billion in frozen Iranian assets.
The Administration insists it is not offering to trade for the
hostages in violation of U.S. policy, the trap that Ronald Reagan
fell into. "We can offer (the Iranians) better opportunities with
the West, but we're not going to hold out anything specific," said
a White House official.
When Cicippio's captors extended the deadline for his execution
by 48 hours, there was cautious optimism at the White House that
diplomatic efforts were paying off. That mood was sorely tested on
Thursday morning, when the kidnapers turned the screws further with
the release of a videotape in which Cicippio read a statement
urging quick action for the release of Obeid. The tape ended with
Cicippio painfully bidding farewell to his wife. But just 45
minutes before he was due to be executed, Hizballah lifted its
death threat indefinitely, though with the condition that it was
now seeking release of further prisoners.
Bush's strongest card with the Iranians may be his contacts
with Algeria, whose intercession helped win the release of the
American hostages in the U.S. embassy in Iran. Algeria's Ambassador
to Beirut, Khaled Hasnawi, helped negotiate the stay of execution,
using Algerian intelligence officers as his mediators with the
kidnapers.
Hizballah later named five prisoners held in Israel that it
wants released, then issued a statement claiming to have "nothing
at all to do with the hostage issue." Even so, Israeli officials
interpreted the decision not to execute Cicippio as proof that
their gamble was paying off, and that the kidnapers would
ultimately agree to a deal for Obeid's release. Cicippio's captors
credited the stay of execution to the intervention of "certain
parties and countries," a sign that Washington's overtures to Iran
might not be falling on deaf ears as in the past.
While Iranian "moderates" have a way of disappointing Western
expectations, Rafsanjani is reportedly convinced that Iran failed
to win its costly war with Iraq because of its international
isolation, which deprived the country of desperately needed
military technology and hardware. In a speech Friday, the new
Iranian President was remarkably conciliatory: "I tell the White
House, the problem of Lebanon has solutions, the freeing of the
hostages has solutions, reasonable, prudent solutions." Rafsanjani
offered: "Come let us approach the problem reasonably. We too will
help solve the problems there."
But the next day Iran was still holding to the line that it had
no connection to the hostage takers. Iran's official Islamic
Republic News Agency quoted an unidentified foreign ministry
official as saying Iran had refused a Bush message about the
hostage-s sent via a third country. "Since the content had nothing
to do with Iran," the news agency quoted the official as saying,
"the message was not accepted." Tehran's denials were contradicted
by an Israeli intelligence report claiming that Obeid had confessed
that Hizballah's terrorist activities were directed by the Iranian
embassies in Beirut and Damascus.
Even so, Rafsanjani's earlier words of conciliation toward a
nation the Ayatullah Khomeini labeled the Great Satan indicate a
major change since Khomeini's death in June. Rafsanjani appears to
have moved with surprising quickness to consolidate his leadership
against challenges from more radical mullahs, particularly Interior
Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashami, the principal link between Tehran
and Hizballah in Lebanon. There are signs that the new President
is also gaining influence over Hizballah, as he must if he is to
deliver on any promises to help in the hostage situation. When
Hizballah leaders went to Tehran several weeks ago to express their
condolences over Khomeini's death, they reported directly to
Rafsanjani. He is believed to have dispatched his own men to
Lebanon to bring into line pockets of Hizballah, including those
loyal to Obeid, that still support Mohtashami.
But it is still far too early for the U.S. to draw firm
conclusions about Rafsanjani. Virtually everything in the region
is so riddled with confusion that no one last week could say for
sure whether Higgins was executed on Monday, as his captors
claimed, or months ago and the tape of his execution saved for use
at a later, advantageous moment. It was not even certain that it
was Higgins whose body was shown in the tape. Forensic experts at
the FBI were carefully measuring and comparing the features of the
man in the videotape with photographs of the captured Marine.
If it was Higgins, both the CIA and Israeli intelligence -- as
well as Bush -- believe he was killed much earlier than last week.
Intelligence specialists point to a number of anomalies that make
them doubt his captors' account of when and how he died. For one
thing, Higgins' captors announced last December that he had been
sentenced to death after making a full confession of espionage
activities.
For another, the figure in the videotape showed no physical
signs of hanging, such as bulging eyes and extruding tongue. He was
dressed in a parka or sweater, which seems unlikely in the middle
of a Middle East summer.
In addition, although his captors claimed to have dumped his
body near a hospital in Syrian-controlled territory in Beirut, no
trace of Higgins has been found there. Marrack Goulding, U.N. Under
Secretary-General of Special Political Affairs, met in Beirut last
week with Shi`ite leaders and Iranian embassy personnel in an
effort to recover Higgins' body. Though the effort failed, Goulding
later told reporters in Damascus that there was "optimism in the
air" in Beirut about the release of hostages.
Last week Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin laid out his
unflinching quid pro quo for hostage trades in Lebanon. "We must
have commanders and leaders of the terror organizations," he said.
"Only when they are in our hands can we move (them) to exchange
prisoners." Jerusalem has not hesitated to resort to kidnaping in
the past. In 1983 Israeli troops in Beirut kidnaped the nephew of
Ahmed Jabril, head of the P.F.L.P. --General Command and later the
suspected mastermind of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Two years
later Israel swapped the captured nephew -- and 1,150 Palestinians
held in Israeli prisons -- for three Israeli soldiers held by
Jabril.
The U.S. has also resorted to kidnaping of a sort, most
famously during the 1985 midair interception of the Achille Lauro
hijackers by fighter planes. In September 1987 FBI agents lured
suspected terrorist Fawaz Younis into international waters off
Cyprus, arrested him aboard a U.S. vessel and flew him to Andrews
Air Force Base for eventual trial and imprisonment. For the most
part, however, the U.S. has adopted a waiting posture, which
critics charge has degenerated into a prescription for inaction.
What else should the U.S. be doing? Three years ago, a White
House task force on terrorism chaired by then Vice President Bush
recommended limited and well-defined military retaliation in a
hostage crisis if all other means failed. "(The panel) would not
approve of wanton destruction of human life . . . in order to show
some muscle," said Bush in introducing the report. Armed force
would be used only "where it can be surgically done."
As a result of task-force recommendations, the State Department
was designated as the lead agency in combating terrorism, with
responsibility for coordinating other Government departments. At
the CIA, a new covert counterterrorism force was set up to combine
intelligence from other groups such as the National Security Agency
and the armed forces. Any raid to rescue the hostages would require
pinpointing where they are held, but the ability of U.S.
intelligence to discover the whereabouts of the hostages is still
limited. Terrorist cells are small, often based on family ties, and
very hard to crack. The killing of two of the CIA's top Middle East
operatives, former hostage William Buckley and Robert Ames,
severely crippled what little was left of any U.S. intelligence
network in the region.
American officials think they know the locations among which
the hostages are moved, like peas in a giant, high-stakes shell
game. But even if they were found, their guards would be likely to
kill them before the rescuers could prevent it. "We've considered
going in for the hostages time and time again for years," says a
senior Administration official. "But it's just an exceptionally
difficult environment in which to operate." Indeed, the U.S.
reportedly knew where Higgins was for several months last year, but
Ronald Reagan refused the Pentagon's pleas to be allowed to go in
after him because of the risk that the remaining hostages would be
killed in retaliation.
A commando raid might not be possible even if Bush ordered one.
The U.S. still lacks special units trained for antiterrorist
warfare. Though Congress has mandated the establishment of a
Special Operations Forces Command, the separate services refuse to
cooperate -- the Navy, for instance, will not assign SEAL units to
the force -- and Congress has not funded equipment like new MC-130
Combat Talon attack aircraft needed to drop commandos in enemy
territory.
The U.S. has met with only limited success when it tried using
more conventional forces to hit back at terrorists. When Jimmy
Carter dispatched Marine helicopters to rescue the embassy hostages
in 1980, the result was wreckage in the desert. Bombing runs over
Lebanon in 1983 resulted in the capture of a naval aviator, Lieut.
Robert Goodman, who was later retrieved by Jesse Jackson. Only the
snatching of the Achille Lauro hijackers and perhaps the 1986
bombing of Libya could be considered effective in reducing
terrorist activity.
There is little support in the Pentagon for a military response
this time. "What are we supposed to hit?" an admiral asked last
week. For the most part, the group has no major command centers
outside heavily populated districts, where an American strike would
be sure to result in many civilian casualties.
A military strike against Iran would probably doom U.S. hopes
to build bridges to Tehran. Any American military action could
isolate Washington from Arab countries just as the U.S. is engaged
in the delicate process of urging Israel and the Palestinians to
negotiate a peaceful settlement concerning the occupation of the
West Bank. Such action would also play directly into the hands of
Israeli hard-liners. On Friday P.L.O. leader Yasser Arafat opened
a congress in Tunis of Al Fatah, the P.L.O.'s chief guerrilla
group, the first such meeting since 1980. The discussions may prove
critical because Arafat's public declarations calling for
negotiations with Israel have brought him under increasing pressure
from more extreme elements in the P.L.O.
Though the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December caused the
number of U.S. terrorist victims last year to shoot up sharply,
hijackings and kidnapings have actually decreased in recent years.
A surge of terrorist incidents was expected after the downing of
the Iranian Airbus by the U.S.S. Vincennes last July, but it did
not take place. French hostages in Lebanon were released last year
with the intervention of Iran.
But hopeful trends do little to help the remaining hostages.
Some Administration officials are pessimistic about the prospects
for a deal as long as one of Hizballah's priorities remains the
release of 15 members of a closely affiliated Shi`ite
fundamentalist group called Al Dawa (the Call). The 15 are
imprisoned in Kuwait for a series of 1983 bomb attacks on the U.S.
and French embassies there. Kuwait has stoutly refused Al Dawa's
demands for the release of the prisoners, some of whom are
relatives of Hizballah leaders. Said a close Bush adviser: "There's
a family tie there, so I would be surprised if anyone could cook
a deal that could get all our hostages released."
In the end, even agility, patience and firmness may not be
enough to thread a way through the thicket of obstacles that block
freedom for the hostages. For all George Bush's best efforts last
week, the only things certain for now are that he has headed off
another terrible execution and heard some encouraging words from
Iran's new leaders. Yet after a decade of outrage and frustration,
the President and the American public may be willing to settle for
such small steps while they strain to see, through the latest
signals from Tehran, at least a glimmer of hope.
-- Dan Goodgame and Bruce van Voorst/Washington and Jon D.
